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
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
STANHOPE
ESSAY
1904

JAMES EDWARD
THE
OLD PRETENDER

H. D. ROOME



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THE OLD PRETENDER

JAMES EDWARD THE OLD PRETENDER

THE STANHOPE ESSAY, 1904

BY
HENRY D. ^{*de la Roche*} ROOME
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—
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. . . . "a pipe for fortune's finger,
To sound what stop she please."

Hamlet, Act III., Scene II.

JAMES EDWARD, THE OLD PRETENDER.

IN the Spring of 1688 the clouds which had burst once before over the Stuart dynasty were fast gathering for the final storm. The efforts of James the Second to restore Catholicism had struck terror into the hearts of his Protestant subjects, many of whom were already intriguing with the Prince of Orange, while those who remained loyal drew their sole consolation from the fact that the Princess Anne, a staunch Protestant, was heir to the throne, all the King's children by his second wife, Mary of Modena, having died in infancy. But this last hope was dispelled when the Queen, who for five years had been childless, gave birth to a son at St. James' Palace on June 10th, 1688. James Francis Edward, ushered into the world at so crucial a moment, became the victim of circumstances from his birth. It is not unnatural that the disappointed Protestants should have railed against an event so little expected and so little desired. Goaded to despair by the rejoicings of their enemies, they loudly proclaimed the child to be supposititious, and spared no arguments, however absurd or mutually inconsistent, which might tend to support this imputation. It was observed that neither the Princess Anne nor the Dutch Ambassador were present, though these were the two persons chiefly interested in the event. It was customary also for the Primate to attend, but Sancroft was one of the seven Bishops who

had been committed to the Tower only the day before. The Queen's accouchement had been announced to take place a month later, at Windsor, but she had repaired suddenly to St. James', where nothing was ready for her reception. Within twelve hours of her arrival the Prince was born, on a Sunday morning, when all the Protestant ladies were at Church, so that the witnesses present were mostly Catholic ladies of the Court, with some Privy Councillors whom the King had hastily summoned. Most suspicious of all was the introduction of a warming-pan into the Queen's bed, although the season was the height of summer. The story gained credence that a supposititious child had been conveyed from a distant part of the Palace in the warming-pan and foisted upon the nation by the Catholics. Other reports,—which differed with regard to time, place, and circumstances—averred that the first child had died, and had been supplanted by a pretender. Much was made of the fact that the Queen's previous children had been puny and short-lived, whereas all who saw this boy declared him to be a remarkably healthy infant. To William and Mary, who had hastened to send congratulations from the Hague, things now looked extremely dubious, while the Princess Anne, to her eternal discredit, busily fomented their suspicions. Anne was assured by her woman, Margaret Dawson, that she could answer for the Prince's legitimacy as much as for her (Anne's) own, having seen them both born.¹ Mrs. Dawson further reminded the Princess that the Queen had given her those proofs of her pregnancy, the absence of which she had complained of to her brother, Lord Clarendon, and to her sister at the Hague.² But Anne preferred to remain sulky, and her evident dissatisfaction

¹ *Macpherson's Original Papers*, ii. 223.

² *Clarendon's Diary*, Oct. 31, 1688.

did much to increase popular prejudice against the infant. So persistent were the rumours of foul play that William of Orange thought it worth while to complain in his declaration of October 10th, that nothing had been done as yet to remove the grave suspicion which had arisen that the Prince of Wales was not born of the Queen. On the 22nd, James deemed it prudent to summon an extraordinary meeting of the Privy Council, before which he laid proofs of his son's birth. Some forty eye-witnesses having deposed to the Prince's legitimacy, the Privy Councillors professed themselves to be abundantly satisfied. But national suspicion, once aroused, was not so easily allayed; the proofs were ridiculed; it was contended that of the forty witnesses more than thirty had said nothing material, while the rest fixed no time to what they deposed.

The King was intensely irritated. There had been more witnesses to the birth of his son than of any Prince ever born, yet by adroit misrepresentation his enemies had given to the event all the appearance of a designed imposture. Nothing of course can convince people who have already made up their minds, and whose interest it is to remain sceptical. But to any impartial inquirer the evidence in favour of a legitimate birth must appear overwhelming. Apart from the circumstantial and corroborative testimony of the numerous eye-witnesses, there is the evidence of Dr. Chamberlayne, who was summoned to attend the Queen at St. James', but arrived too late to be of assistance. Being a noted Whig, he thinks they would never have hazarded such a secret as a supposititious child, which he must have come soon enough to discover, had he been at home.¹ The female midwife often complained

¹ Letter of Dr. Chamberlayne to the Electress Sophia, published in Dalrymple.

of Jesuit "pragmaticalness," but was certain no such thing as bringing a strange child in a warming-pan could be practised without her seeing it, "attending constantly in and about all the avenues of the chamber."¹ Still more significant is our knowledge of a similar intention, six years earlier, if James had had a son instead of a daughter, "to make a Perkin of him."² Finally, the fact, which has never been challenged, that Mary of Modena in 1692 gave birth to a daughter in France, affords a sufficient answer to the principal objection, namely, that the Queen was past child-bearing.

Historians are now generally agreed in acquitting James of the fraud which was widely imputed to him at the time. But it is impossible to exonerate the King from all blame. He could not be ignorant of the reports which were circulated during the Queen's pregnancy. It was therefore his interest to take all possible precautions to make the birth of his child as indisputable as such an event could be; but instead of calling in unsuspected witnesses, care was taken to remove all those who were not entirely devoted to the measures of the Court. In later life the Pretender was easy to recognise for a Stuart, much resembling in face the portraits of James the Second, and even of Marshal Berwick, his natural brother.³ All who saw him found no difficulty in believing his royal descent, but it can only be regarded as unfortunate for one who aspired to the throne of England that his legitimacy should even have been called in question. For years pamphlets⁴ were published

¹ Letter of Dr. Chamberlayne to the Electress Sophia, published in Dalrymple.

² *Observator*, No. 194, August 23, 1682. Dalrymple.

³ Charles de Brosse, *L'Italie il y a cent ans*, ii. 95.

⁴ The most persistent of these libellers was one Fuller, who did not scruple to print copies of letters purporting to have been written

denouncing "the pretended Prince of Wales," and the story of the warming-pan was revived on every occasion of Jacobite activity.

The childhood of James Edward was to be no unfitting prelude to his chequered career. The storm of revolution burst over the last Stuart King, and the royal infant shared unconsciously in the troubles of his parents. Upon the news of William's landing at Torbay, he was sent to Portsmouth, in the charge of Lord Dartmouth, in order that he might be conveyed in a yacht to France. This intention became known to several captains of the fleet, who resolved to seize the Prince as the yacht came out of Portsmouth. Representing to Dartmouth that it might be dangerous to himself to suffer his escape when the nation was in confusion and the government unsettled, they prevailed upon him to give orders to intercept the vessel. The baggage and necessaries for the child were on board, and he was on the point of sailing, when the conspirators learnt that he had suddenly been carried off to London in the Governor's coach. It was suspected, not unnaturally, that the discovery emanated from Dartmouth, who could neither avoid giving the orders they required, nor suffer them to be put into execution.¹

As William advanced, the unhappy James was de- by Mary of Modena and some of her ladies. If genuine, these letters furnish proof positive of an organised Catholic plot to impose an usurper on the English nation. But Fuller failed to produce his witnesses when called upon by Parliament to do so, and was voted "a notorious impostor, a cheat, and a false accuser."

Among the more interesting of numerous pamphlets in the Bodleian Library relating to the same subject, is one entitled *A Melius Inquirendum into the Birth of the Prince of Wales*, printed in 1689 and published among the Somers' Tracts. It presents the various grounds of suspicion in the form of an oracular dialogue, and serves as an admirable summary of the case against a legitimate birth.

¹ MSS. of Byng, Lord Torrington, appended to Dalrymple.

serted by his officers, including Churchill whom he had trusted with his most secret counsels, and even by his daughter Anne. In this extremity he resolved on flight. The Queen with the Prince in her arms crossed the Thames by night in a wherry, and proceeded by coach to Gravesend. After a stormy passage she landed at Calais and in due course reached St. Germain, where she was joined by her husband. Louis the Fourteenth received the fugitives with that princely hospitality for which he was justly famous. He assigned the palace of St. Germain-en-Laye to their use, with an annual allowance of 600,000 francs for the support of their household, and gave James every assistance for his campaign in Ireland.

To this period belongs the little monograph¹ which James composed for the future guidance of his son. This document, despite its scrappiness, is of interest as setting forth the reflections which the Revolution suggested to James, and as foreshadowing the probable results of a Stuart restoration. A lawyer is never to be made Lord Chancellor, and the Treasury is to be kept always in commission. Great stress is laid upon the importance of the navy, as the bulwark and glory of the kingdom. He recommends neither a Lord High Admiral, nor Commissioners, but a Secretary of State for that department, which ought always to be the chief care, and must therefore be under the immediate inspection, of the King. Further, with a view to securing religious peace, he advises his son to have four Secretaries of State; of whom only one, should the Test Act be repealed, ought to be a Catholic, one a Presbyterian, and two of the Church of England. With these general instructions are included some rules of private conduct,

¹ *Instructions for my Son, the Prince of Wales.* The original is among the Stuart papers in the Scots College, Paris.

in which James lays special emphasis on the difficulty of providing for natural children. "If you have daughters," he says, "you will be obliged to give them portions, and to provide them with husbands, whom you must dignify with honours or enrich with places. If you have sons, you must furnish them with estates out of the demesnes of the Crown: and give them employments, to the exclusion of men of merit, and of the ancient nobility who have a right to your favour." The dilemma is as uninviting as it is unavoidable, and the moral seems not to have been entirely thrown away upon James Edward, whose private life, though far from faultless, compares favourably with the records of his house.

Meanwhile the young Prince was growing up with the children of Jacobite families who had followed their sovereigns into exile. He was from the first a favourite with the French King, and his winning childish manners made him popular with the court. He was encouraged to make himself proficient in fencing and riding, and seems in every way to have been admirably brought up. He and his sister, as soon as they were of an age to understand the hardships of the Jacobite families, devoted much of their pocket-money to their relief. The exiled King and Queen lived as quietly as they were able at St. Germain, and imposed vigorous self-denial on themselves in order to administer to the wants of their followers. Their hopes of a restoration, which had been dashed by the destruction of the French fleet off La Hogue, were revived by the news of Queen Mary's death, for it was expected that an immediate rupture would take place between William and Anne on account of his retaining the throne, to which she stood in a nearer degree of relationship. But if Anne imagined that she had any claims while her father and brother

lived, she was too astute to press them, knowing that the crown had been settled on William for life. Yet another disappointment was in store for James. The resources of Louis broke down before the European coalition so skilfully engineered by his rival, whose title as King of Great Britain he acknowledged at the Peace of Ryswick, promising to abstain from assisting James and his family, though he would not consent to deprive them of their asylum at St. Germain. William bound himself in return, by a secret article, to adopt the son of James the Second as his successor, provided he received a Protestant education.¹ This clause Louis triumphantly announced to James, but Mary of Modena without giving her husband time to reply said she would rather see her son in his grave than possessor of the crown to his father's prejudice.² The French King accordingly changed the subject, chagrined at the failure of his own solution of the problem, and impatient with a mother who could refuse such an offer.

In March 1701, James the Second sustained a severe stroke of apoplexy, which was followed by paralysis. He lingered through the summer, but in September suffered a second stroke, and expired on the 16th. At his death with great formality he bequeathed the British thrones to his son, appointing his Queen regent during the minority. The moment after he had breathed his last, a herald appeared before the gates of St. Germain, and proclaimed his son by the title of James the Third, King of England, Scotland, Ireland, and *France*. The impulsive Louis, after deciding, by the advice of his council, not to recognise the Prince as James the Third,

¹ *Dalrymple's Memoirs*, Part III. Book V.

² "Au préjudice de son père." *Mémoires du Maréchal de Berwick*, (1702) I. 409.

had yielded¹ to the tears and entreaties of the widowed mother, supported by Madame de Maintenon. Philip, Duke of Anjou, hastened likewise, with the dignity of a man who had effaced the Pyrenees, to acknowledge the claims of the young King. Louis, however, tempered his zeal by a discreet note to the Courts of Europe, in which he disclaimed all intention of disturbing William in the peaceable possession of his dominions. In England the new King was declared guilty of high treason; a Bill of Attainder was passed against him, and shortly afterwards a reward was offered for his apprehension.

William the Third followed his father-in-law to the grave, and Anne was proclaimed Queen without opposition. James Edward contented himself with publishing a manifesto by way of protestation, to establish his rights against those of his sister. But measures for a more effective protest were being secretly concerted in his interest by Louis the Fourteenth. If the state of parties in England was unfavourable to his designs, in Scotland it was far otherwise. The Scots were proud of having supplied a race of Kings to England, and sympathised with the exiled house. For years the nobles of Scotland had been accustomed to limp² about the room drinking treasonable healths; they were Jacobite almost to a man, as were the people generally. Moreover, the animosity which had always existed between the two kingdoms was increased at this time on account of the failure of the Darien Company, a misfortune which the Scots imputed solely to English

¹ Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, Ch. XVII. This account is corroborated by Bolingbroke's letters.

² To "limp" meant Louis XIV.

James II.
Mary of Modena.
Prince of Wales.

Macaulay's Diary Oct. 3, 1854.

hostility. There was need, however, of careful organisation if anything was to be done; but, unhappily for James Edward, the person forthcoming for this purpose was the last to whom such a charge should have been committed. The notorious Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, after offering his services in vain to James the Second at Saint Germain, had turned Roman Catholic, and insinuated himself, through the influence of the Pope's nuncio, into the confidence of the exiled Queen. So plausible were his representations of the state of feeling in Scotland that Louis supplied him with money, and sent him back to procure credentials from those over whom he asserted that he had so much influence. Lovat accordingly travelled in the Jacobite interest through England and Scotland in the summer of 1703, meeting, if his own account may be believed, with remarkable success. In Durham a deputation waited upon him, "to entreat him to inform the Queen that all the Catholics in the north of England, who were very numerous and powerful, were ready to venture their lives and fortunes for the King, whenever his banners should be displayed in that country."¹ No less satisfactory was his reception in the Highlands. "He shewed them the King's instructions and the King of France's great promises. They were ravished to see them, and prayed to God to have their King there, and they should soon put him on the throne."² Protestations of loyalty were always a strong point with the clans, but Lovat's reputation in Scotland was so infamous on account of his past crimes that none of the leading families would have anything to do with him. The Duke of Hamilton was probably the most able and

¹ Lord Lovat's Memorial, *Macpherson's Original Papers*, i. 641 et seq.

² *Ibid.*

powerful of the Scottish Jacobites. But he was cautious as well as able, and his caution was at times mistaken for lukewarmness in the cause. Proud and reserved to a degree, his semi-regal bearing gave rise to the suspicion that he aimed at the throne of Scotland for himself. In the Duke of Atholl he possessed a formidable rival for the privilege of superintending James Edward's affairs in his native kingdom. Atholl was haughty and self-opinionated, but a man of strict probity; moreover, the resources at his command were invaluable to the Jacobites, for he could raise five thousand men, armed and disciplined, on his own estates. Now were seen the consequences of employing so disreputable an agent as Lovat, for apart from the distrust¹ which he inspired in all who knew his record, he discredited Hamilton with the Court at St. Germain, and betrayed Atholl to Queensberry, the High Commissioner, divulging at the same time the designs of the Jacobites. The man was in fine an unprincipled adventurer, intent only on selling himself to the highest bidder. The disgust in which he was held in Scotland may be judged from Lockhart's estimate of his whole mission as a deep-laid plot on the part of Queensberry for "the destruction of those who opposed the designs of the Scots Courtiers and English Ministry against Scotland."² Lovat on his return to France found his splendid promises coldly received at St. Germain, for Mary of Modena had been informed of his treachery, and persuaded Louis to have him imprisoned. His coadjutor, James Murray, who discharged his share in the mission with credit, seems from the first to have been honoured with a higher measure of confidence than was vouchsafed to Lovat himself by the

¹ See the report of Captain James Murray, who accompanied Lovat on his tour. *Macpherson's Original Papers*, i. 665.

² *Lockhart Memoirs*, 83.

French Court, for among the Nairne papers is a copy of instructions which he was to deliver to Hamilton, comprising several points of interest. Thus the Duke was to try to obtain Anne's consent to a treaty which would leave her in possession of the crown of England during her lifetime, provided that she would secure the succession to her brother after her death. For this purpose it was insisted that while the policy of filling the services and important posts in the kingdom with persons well-affected to the Jacobite interest was excellent in itself, yet neither those means nor the Act of Occasional Conformity would be sufficient, unless the settlement in favour of the family of Hanover were overturned. It was further suggested that the most effectual means of securing the crown of England to James Edward after the death of his sister would be to put him immediately in possession of the crown of Scotland, a measure which might the more easily be carried out as the two kingdoms were independent of each other. That some such design was seriously apprehended by the Whigs appears from a letter published among the original Hanover papers, in which a series of Jacobite moves is anticipated by the writer. First, it seems, Church government was to be placed under the control of the Episcopal party, who were to use their influence with the Parliament of Scotland in favour of the succession of James Edward; that point gained, they would then represent the danger of Scotland's having a king of its own, and thus pave the way for annulling the Act of Settlement, as absolutely necessary to preserve the peace of both kingdoms.¹ Considerations of this kind may well have set English statesmen thinking of a union between the two kingdoms, as the only assured means of checkmating the Scots. This project began to take definite shape as the

¹ Scot to Robethon, May 18, 1703.

Scotch Parliament continued to devise delays and exact concessions before proceeding to settle the succession on the House of Hanover in compliance with the English demands. In March, 1706, sixty-two Commissioners were appointed equally from England and Scotland to treat about terms of union. The scheme provoked fierce indignation among the Scots, and public feeling ran high. Armed mobs patrolled the streets of Edinburgh and Glasgow; at Dumfries the Articles of Union were publicly burnt, and a protestation against them was affixed to the city cross. In the Western Shires the Cameronians divided themselves into regiments, chose officers, procured horses and arms, talked of the restoration of the King, and even became reconciled with the Northern Shires and the Episcopal party, with whom they concerted in appointing correspondents and sending out emissaries. In the face of such widespread opposition the Act was nevertheless passed, and became law on May 1, 1707. While in one sense it may be said to have cut the ground from under the feet of James Edward, the impulse which it gave to Scottish national spirit more than compensated the Jacobites for their technical defeat. Scotland was now ripe for any enterprise which might offer chances of retaliation upon the sister kingdom. And now, too, the moment was come for Louis to improve his game by advancing the pawn which had so long been awaiting this decision.

II.

The French descent of 1708, now seldom referred to, may fairly be described as the most auspicious, the best concerted, and the most nearly successful of the whole series of Jacobite enterprises. Louis the Fourteenth, having for some years been engaged in the Spanish Succession War, conceived that he could not deal England a more effective blow than by fitting out an expedition in aid of his guest at St. Germain. If successful, the invasion would transform a powerful enemy into a powerful ally, while in any case it might free his hands abroad by recalling Marlborough to guard his own door. Advices from Scotland kept Louis well informed of the discontent in that kingdom, which he systematically fomented by sending agents to stir up the Jacobites. After Lovat and the Murrays, Colonel Nathaniel Hooke was twice despatched to Scotland with full credentials from France.¹ Arriving for the second time shortly before the Union came into effect, Hooke found the state of the country as it had been described, and in the discharge of his mission proved himself a diplomatist of the first order. He was passed on from one to another of the nobility, winning promises of support by his unfailing tact, and appealing to their good sense to bury all private animosities and unite loyally in the common cause. But it would have been well for

¹ As a proof of how much Louis was in earnest, Hooke was at first to have brought arms and ammunition; but this plan was changed for the less dangerous one of merely treating with the principal Jacobites.

him occasionally to forget that it was Louis and not James Edward who had commissioned him; the extreme care with which he shrank from pledging the French King to anything definite caused the Scots to feel at times that they were giving all and receiving nothing.

Hamilton was especially incredulous regarding the intentions of Louis, whose intrigues seemed so long in coming to maturity. But the Duke's star at this time was under an eclipse. His conduct with regard to the Union had exasperated the Cavaliers, and with some justification: for it is more than doubtful if the measure would have passed its preliminary stages in the Scottish Parliament, but for his betrayal of the party in his anxiety to be placed on the Commission.¹ Disappointed in this, Hamilton became bitterly hostile to the Union when it was too late; as a means of inducing the English to drop the scheme, he even proposed that the Scottish Parliament should ratify the Hanoverian Succession. The truth seems to have been that next to striving for his own aggrandisement, the Duke was a Scotchman first and a Jacobite afterwards; his pride was hurt at the idea of his country being used as a cats-paw either by England or France for the furtherance of their own ends. But so far as the Jacobite party in Scotland could be distinguished from the national party, Hamilton by his tergiversations had contrived to lose the confidence of both. Even the Presbyterians had broken with him upon his refusal to permit them to arm, and they had since addressed themselves to the Dukes of Gordon and Atholl. Hooke was advised by the Jacobites not to neglect Hamilton, but at the same time

¹ *Lockhart Memoirs*, 132, 3. In support of this contention, Lockhart urges that he "never heard of any other reason for the Duke of Argyle not being on the Treaty than his having engaged on his honour to get Hamilton on, or else that he would not be concerned in it himself."

to be on his guard, and to conceal from him all that he transacted with the other lords.

The Duke was reserved and cold. He pleaded illness as a reason for not granting Hooke a personal interview; and, while expressing every solicitude for the success of his mission, hinted clearly that he had come too late, and that the animosity of the nation against the English was greatly abated. He deprecated the notion that James Edward should come to Scotland in person; asked what assistance Louis was prepared to render; and, to Hooke's thinking, appeared only anxious to implicate his master beyond opportunity of withdrawal. Finally, Hamilton demanded that the French King should either secure a strong post in England, or else send a body of troops for the conquest of that kingdom, to act in conjunction with the Scottish army—the number required he estimated at ten thousand. Hooke found it hard to conceal his mortification: he wondered whether the Duke was secretly reconciled to the English Court, or was merely raising difficulties that he might be the more entreated, or whether after all he intended to strike for the throne himself. He however answered plainly that although Louis had a great desire to assist the Scots, he did not pretend to make their cause his principal affair; he would help them to go to war, but would not make war for them, and at his own expense. While matters were still unsettled, Hooke contrived to intercept some letters, from which he learnt that the Duke thought himself strong enough to place James Edward on the throne of England unassisted, and that his sole object in pressing these demands was to "embarrass" Louis the Fourteenth. On hearing this, the Colonel washed his hands of Hamilton, and threw himself into the arms of Atholl, who now directed the Jacobite plans. Hamilton seeing himself thus slighted

became less inclined than ever to countenance the French designs. Still he continued to correspond with St. Germain, and assured James Edward that his party were ready to venture all when he required it; only warning him that a faint attempt, if it miscarried, would probably prove fatal to his person, and would certainly ruin his future prospects by cementing the Union. It was clear, he said, "if once they drew their swords, they must throw away their sheaths." He therefore advised him not to make the attempt unless he was able to carry it through, adding that for this purpose ten thousand regular troops at least were required from France. He further recommended him to take measures to satisfy the people as to the security of their civil and religious rights, without which he could not expect to succeed, and in doing which there were great difficulties, because of the different parties in the kingdom. The Duke was really too sane for a conspirator; in their hatred of England the Scots were willing to take James Edward on almost any terms. Atholl and his party, although too ready to answer for all the Highlands, shewed greater despatch in bringing treason to a head. Hamilton's signature is missing from the sanguine memorial¹ which Hooke carried back to his master from the Scottish peers and chiefs. "The greatest part of Scotland has always been well disposed for the service of its lawful king ever since the revolution . . . But this good disposition is now become universal. The shires of the west, which used to be the most disaffected, are now very zealous for the service of their lawful king." The presence of James Edward is declared to be "absolutely necessary" to

¹ *Secret History of Colonel Hooke's Negotiations in Scotland in 1707 : being the Original Letters and Papers which passed between the Scotch and Irish Lords and the Courts of Versailles and St. Germain (Edin. 1760), pp. 69, et seq.*

encourage the people; upon his arrival "the whole nation will rise; he will become master of Scotland without any opposition, and the present government will be entirely abolished. Out of the numbers that will rise we will draw 25,000 foot and 5,000 horse and dragoons; and with this army we will march strait into England." Full particulars are added as to a suitable rendezvous for the troops from the various shires, with minute details concerning supplies. Louis is humbly entreated to furnish money, arms, and a general of distinguished rank, "that the first men in Scotland may be obliged to obey him without difficulty." Marshal Berwick, James Edward's half-brother, was clearly meant, and his presence would have been invaluable to the Jacobites. Sufficient troops were also asked to secure the person of James Edward against any sudden attempt on the part of the 2000 English troops on foot in Scotland, the number to be regulated "according to the place where the King of England shall land." Armed with this document Hooke took leave of his friends in May, 1707, and with an assurance that James Edward should be in Scotland by the following August, returned to France.

But now Louis hung back. Preparations for such an expedition took time, and the Ministers of War and Marine were at loggerheads. Marshal Berwick, moreover, had temporarily retrieved the position of France by his victory at Almanza, so that the need of a diversion in Scotland was less urgent. Some weeks before August the date for making the attempt was postponed; other times were named, only to be altered, until the year closed without the event seeming any nearer execution. The Scots began to fear that their king was little more than a tool in the hands of the wily French monarch, and none were more of this opinion than the Duke of Hamilton. The long delay became, of course, extremely

dangerous; but the secret, though widely shared, was well guarded, until at last news was brought early in February that the expedition was resolved on, and would take place between then and the middle of March.

All things considered, the Scots had good reason to be sanguine. The whole nation was ready to welcome James Edward, and set him on the throne. The government troops wanted arms and ammunition; most of them would gladly have joined the insurgents. The garrisons were unprovided, and must have yielded at the first summons. The money sent from England as compensation for the Union was still in the country, and a good part of it in Edinburgh Castle. A Dutch fleet, too, had opportunely run aground some time before on the coast of Angus, supplied with powder, cannon and small arms, besides a large sum of money. In England the regular troops were scarcely 5000, and those for the most part newly raised. The government moreover had their hands tied with the European war; if they turned to quell a rising in Scotland, the French would have a fair opportunity of reducing Holland, and thus breaking up the confederacy.

Preparations in France were completed by the beginning of March, 1708. James Edward, accompanied by 6000¹ regular troops was to be landed in Scotland by a French fleet under the command of the Comte de Forbin. Louis furnished the Prince with magnificent services of gold and silver, with liveries for his servants, rich clothes for his life guards, and all the glittering appurtenances of a court. At parting he presented him with a sword, the hilt studded with diamonds. "Adieu!" he said, "the

¹ According to Berwick (*Memoirs* ii., 142), but d'Andrezel says 5,100 (*Col. Hooke's Negotiations*, pp. 139 et seq.), while Lockhart (*Memoirs*, 376) computes them at less than 5000.

best wish that I can make you is that I may never see your face again."

But James Edward was not destined to come into his kingdom. A number of factors combined to ruin the "just and glorious enterprise" of the Scots. Forbin proved a regular old woman; from the outset he took a despondent view of his command, and only became more fussy on finding his jeremiads ignored. The Prince developed measles at Dunkirk, which delayed the start and dispirited the troops, who had to be disembarked in the interval. England, too, was at last waking up to the danger. Sir George Byng appeared off Dunkirk with thirty-eight men-of-war, but having ascertained that the French were not ready to start, returned to the Downs. Meanwhile the Prince recovered, and the troops were taken on board. Still Forbin deferred putting out in a choppy sea, until positively compelled to do so; and it was not until the afternoon of March 6th that the French fleet finally sailed. A gale having sprung up they were detained in Newport Pits until the 8th, and owing to a circuitous course did not arrive in the Forth till the afternoon of the 12th. Finding the wind and tide contrary, they dropped anchor for the night off the Isle of May, intending next morning to sail up the river and land troops and ammunition. Byng in the meantime learnt that they had left Dunkirk: he at once started in pursuit, and overtook them on the morning after their arrival in Scottish waters. Forbin, instead of running into the Forth, where his smaller ships might easily have evaded capture among the creeks and shallows, thought only of making good his escape into the open sea. Byng gave chase, but the swift French frigates had no difficulty in outsailing him, with the exception of the *Salisbury*, which had formerly been taken from the English, and was now recaptured. Having thrown off his pursuers,

the Prince was anxious to land at Inverness; but Forbin would not hear of running any more risks, and steered back to Dunkirk where he arrived without further mishap.

The Scots were bitterly disappointed at this pitiful miscarriage of their plot. When the fleet was reported off the coast numbers took up arms, only to be arrested. The castle and prisons of Edinburgh were crammed with nobility and gentry whose zeal had outrun their discretion. In England a total collapse of credit ensued on its becoming known that the French had sailed, and had the news of their flight before Byng came a day later, the Bank must have stopped payment. Ten British battalions were hurriedly shipped from Holland to meet the emergency. But these and similar precautions would have been totally inadequate if the French had succeeded in landing. That they failed to do so was due very much more to misadventure than to English foresight and skill. But for their detention in Newport Pits, they might have been in the Forth before Byng knew that they had even started. Had they not lost precious time by holding far out to sea in the vain hope of eluding observation; had they brought a Scotch pilot from Dunkirk to take them up the Forth as soon as they arrived; had a bolder man than Forbin been in command; in short, had the thousand and one unforeseen contingencies which worked against them turned in their favour—the course of English history must have been profoundly altered since 1708.

A word seems necessary here with regard to the good faith of Louis the Fourteenth. It has been suggested¹ that he gave secret orders to Forbin not to land, hoping that the Scots would rise at the appearance of the fleet. But such duplicity would have been utterly at variance

¹ *Lockhart Memoirs*, 375.

with the many favours which Louis had done to the exiled family, and particularly to the Prince himself. In the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Ryswick, he had consistently refused to purchase diplomatic advantages at the price of banishing the fugitives from his dominions.¹ Further, the Scots had insisted on the presence of James Edward as indispensable, and nothing could have been easier than for Forbin to land the Prince on the first night, if treachery had been intended. Again, Louis had notified his intentions to foreign Courts, and the imputation of having abused the confidence of a suppliant Prince was assuredly the last to which the "Grand Monarque" would have deliberately exposed himself.

James Edward relieved his feelings by serving with the French army in the Low Countries, under the title of the Chevalier de St. George. His father having invested him with the companionship of the national order, he found it a convenient style, as it saved the expense of a state consistent with royalty. Of his conduct at the battle of Oudenarde, in July, Marshal Boufflers wrote to Louis: "The Chevalier de St. George behaved himself during the whole action with all possible bravery and vivacity." It is interesting to note in passing that his cousin and successful rival—afterwards George the Second—displayed equal valour in the opposite ranks on the same occasion. At Malplaquet James Edward charged twelve times at the head of the household troops of France; his courage and affability made him generally popular with the soldiers. Ill-health, however, proved a constant source of trouble. In 1705 he had been attacked by a violent illness from which he was not expected to recover; between his campaigns in the Netherlands he caught

¹ Traill's *William III.*, 152-4.

the intermittent fever of the country at Mons; in April, 1712, he contracted small-pox, of which disease his sister died. We shall have occasion hereafter to reproach the Pretender on the score of irresolution and apathy; be it remembered always, in mitigation, that his health was at no time robust, while in special emergencies it would commonly break down completely.

III.

The Chevalier appears not to have been discouraged by his want of success. The Scots still adhered steadfastly to his cause. In 1711 the Duchess of Gordon openly presented the Faculty of Advocates with a medal, representing on one side the head of James Edward with the words "Cujus Est?" and on the reverse the British Islands with the motto "Reddite." But the Scots, as usual, lacked organisation and concert, so that the government could afford to overlook their seditious mutterings. Nor was the outlook much brighter in England, despite the unvarying optimism of the Jacobite agents. James Edward seems to have built great hopes on the good intentions of Anne towards him, in which he was strengthened by secret assurances from most of the leading statesmen, who intrigued by turns with himself and with the Elector of Hanover. But whether Anne cared at all for her brother is doubtful; that she designed his restoration is certainly false. "The Queen," wrote Swift, "to my knowledge, hated and despised the Pretender." Anne, be it remembered, in her speech to Parliament in 1708, was the first officially to stigmatize James Edward as the "Pretender." The Duchess of Marlborough admitted in 1712 that "all the time she had known the Queen, she had never heard her speak a favourable word of the Pretender."¹ The Jacobites appear, however, to have believed that the Queen's sympathy was enlisted in their cause, but that obstacles, arising partly from her timorous nature, partly from the

¹ *Portland MS*, v. 338.

divisions in her ministry, restrained her from making any public avowal.¹ Reports,² imperfectly authenticated, told of her concern, particularly during illness, at "nothing being done" for her brother. In 1711 the Chevalier addressed an eloquent appeal to the Queen, imploring her to assist him to the succession after her death. "The voice of God and nature calls you to it; the promises you made to the King, our father, enjoin it; the preservation of our family, the preventing of unnatural wars, require it; and the public good and welfare of our country recommend it to you, to rescue it from present and future evils."³ Anne seems, however, to have resembled Elizabeth in her aversion to a "winding-sheet." Bolingbroke years afterwards assured Chesterfield that "he never had any fixed scheme in relation to the Pretender, and that he had always avoided speaking of him to the Queen, who did not like to hear anything of a successor."⁴

But the Chevalier's religion proved now, as always, the greatest obstacle to his restoration. As early as 1706, Anne had written to the Elector of Hanover: "I have nothing so much at heart as to preserve our religion and the tranquillity of my subjects, by leaving these kingdoms to the mild dominion of my Protestant heirs."⁵ Buckingham, who pleaded her brother's cause with the Queen, was informed that the Pretender had "disobliged" her too much by refusing to abjure Catholicism.⁶ James Edward indeed was Quixotic enough to think that by refusing to change or even to dissemble

¹ *Lockhart Commentary*, 317.

² *Carte Papers*. See also *Macpherson's Original Papers*, ii. 528.

³ *Macpherson's Original Papers*, ii. 223.

⁴ *Memoirs of Lord Chesterfield*, i. 26.

⁵ *Macpherson's Original Papers*, ii. 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii. 389. See also Buckingham's letter to James Edward—*Ibid.*, ii. 327.

his beliefs, he evinced high moral qualities which could not fail to recommend him to all men of honour—an argument which was much too refined for popular apprehension. Bolingbroke, Oxford, Buckingham, Gaultier, Iberville, all dashed themselves in vain against his impenetrable obstinacy. "I neither want counsel nor advice," he wrote in 1714, "to remain unalterable in my fixt resolution of never dissembling my religion; but rather to abandon all than act against my conscience and honour, cost what it will."¹ The utmost that could be wrung from him was a promise of toleration.² Such pertinacity may have been creditable to his character; it was simply suicidal to his prospects. Is the ethical code to prescribe strict uniformity, admitting no degrees of latitude between the cloister and the throne? Henri Quatre was content to gain Paris in exchange for a mass. Charles the Second contrived to stifle his religious opinions; if his brother had done the same, there would have been no "Pretender." For James Edward the opportunity passed, never to return. When the Hanoverian dynasty was established; when enthusiasm for the exile had cooled; when the Prince himself was domiciled in Rome, and a pensionary of the Catholic powers, his religion landed him in a dilemma from which there was no escape. To persevere in it was to render himself unacceptable to the people of England, while to abandon it was to forfeit the help from abroad which was indispensable to success. A feature which detracts from the moral worth of his resolve is the peculiar character of his religious principles. His life was far from being the rule of temperance; he inherited, if in a less degree, the vices which have marred his race.

¹ *Macpherson's Original Papers*, ii, 525. "A letter to a person in England, to be shown to his friends there."

² *Ibid.*, ii, 225.

Yet in the observance of minute regulations no man was more punctilious. Witness his wholly superfluous.¹ application to the Pope, during his illness in 1756, for leave to take broth after midnight when he intends to communicate in the morning. Bolingbroke found in him "all the superstition of a Capuchin, no tincture of the religion of a prince. The spring of his whole conduct is fear. Fear of the horns of the devil and of the flames of hell. He has been taught to believe that nothing but a blind submission to the Church of Rome and a strict adherence to all the terms of that communion can save him from these dangers Few of the Roman Catholics themselves did not think him too much of a Papist."² In the Chevalier's religious attitude there may be something to admire, but there is much also to suspect, and not a little to despise. Whatever we may think of the spiritual excellence of his resolve, it must be obvious that fears and scruples do not go far towards the attainment of a kingdom.

The Jacobite agents in England greatly overestimated the strength of their cause. That they should have done so is not surprising, seeing how many members of the government trafficked with them in secret. The crop of statesmen produced by the Revolution stands unique in English history. The cynicism which pervaded all channels at the Restoration had not failed to leave its mark upon politics; the Revolution stereotyped this, until statesmanship resolved itself into adroit trimming, and well-timed treachery became a criterion of political foresight. Of the original

¹ *Sanctissimi domini nostri Benedicti Papae XIV Bullarium Tomus Tertius* (Venetiis 1778. ex typographia Joannis Gatti). The Pope reminds James Edward that no dispensation is necessary, "cum res fit de exiguo cibo, necessitate cogente, non ex animi levitate sumpto."

² *Letter to Wyndham.*

actors, some still lingered before the footlights, their selfishness ingrained by habit, and their dishonesty increased with age. Others were replaced and surpassed by the new order. Godolphin and Halifax continued to trim with a dexterity which long practice had rendered easy; in St. John they beheld a subtler Ashley, in Harley a more unprincipled Buckingham. From this period dates too the rise of Walpole, in whose hands Parliamentary corruption was to become an acknowledged factor of civil government. Nor was the pollution confined to politicians;—in cold scheming hypocrisy the great Marlborough surpassed them all. The brilliant novelist, whose art too often renders him insensible to the claims of history, has in this instance reconciled the two with happy effect:—"St. John was for St. John, and Harley for Oxford, and Marlborough for John Churchill, always."¹

In 1710 the long ascendancy of the Whigs drew to a close. The undue protraction of the war; popular distrust of Marlborough and the Queen's dislike for his Duchess; the disturbing influence of Sunderland in the Cabinet; the fatal blunder of Sacheverell's impeachment—all contributed to their downfall. The Tories, led by Harley and St. John, took up office, and speedily entered on negotiations for peace. Among them, Henry St. John, created Viscount Bolingbroke in 1712, stands out pre-eminently. The Peace of Utrecht was in a special sense his work, and he alone of the ministers could point to a definite policy. The goal towards which his efforts were directed was the apotheosis of Toryism. To establish the Tory system on an immovable basis, proof against the machinations of the Whigs, and able to dictate terms to the Crown—this was the ideal which Bolingbroke set before himself. But this programme

¹ *Esmond*, Book III. ch. x.

did not include the Pretender. Bolingbroke intrigued with James Edward, just as Godolphin had done before him, and as Oxford was doing at this very time; but even if he desired a restoration, to his practised eye the difficulties may well have appeared insuperable. The feeling of the country made such a project venturesome, the Queen's temper made it impolitic, Acts of Parliament made it treasonable. The scheme for the succession of the House of Hanover was on the contrary most mature; it had been prepared for years, and preached by the Whigs on every occasion. Bolingbroke was not averse from receiving a sovereign from Germany; but he was determined to confront such a sovereign with an impenetrable phalanx of Tories—a Tory army, a Tory bench, and Tory officers of state—and to bind the new ruler hand and foot in the bonds of Tory principles. The identification in fact of the new dynasty with a stern unbending Toryism was the aim of Bolingbroke; but in this he was forestalled by the Whigs, who had already persuaded the Elector that his triumph must be their triumph and their ruin his ruin. "The art of the Whigs," wrote Bolingbroke afterwards,¹ "was to blend as undistinguishably as they could, all their party interests with those of the succession. The Whigs desired nothing more than to have it thought that the successor was theirs, if I may repeat an insolent expression which was held at that time The Jacobites insinuated industriously the same thing, and represented that the establishment of the House of Hanover would be the establishment of the Whig party."

The knowledge that he was eyed with suspicion in Hanover may have turned Bolingbroke's thoughts to St. Germans, but that he had no formed design to bring in the Chevalier is sufficiently established by his own

¹ *Essay Of the State of Parties.*

admissions, by the evidence of his contemporaries, and by the substantial agreement of modern historians. Bolingbroke suffered from want of time. Urgent as was the succession, the peace was more urgent still. His anxiety for peace led him to court the Jacobites, who formed,—under the leadership of Ormonde, Buckingham, Harcourt and Atterbury,—a small but far from insignificant section of the Tories. Peace with France was by no means to their liking, for it meant the loss of that French support which was so essential to their plots; but peace was the chief feature in the Tory programme, and the Jacobites submitted to the inevitable. Still less congenial was the Barrier Treaty of 1713, by which England agreed to aid Holland in repelling any attack upon her barrier, while Holland was to furnish 6000 men if the Protestant succession was threatened. But from the new appointments at Court in 1713 they derived infinite satisfaction. Wyndham was made Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Duke of Atholl Privy Seal for Scotland, the Jacobite Earl of Mar Secretary of State for the same kingdom. The polemic Atterbury was raised to the see of Rochester. Ormonde was appointed Warden of the Cinque Ports, which accounted for the principal strongholds of the coast. Berwick and Edinburgh were likewise in safe hands, while the government of Ireland was in a great degree under the control of its Jacobite Chancellor, Sir Constantine Phipps. Bolingbroke having strengthened himself by an alliance with the Church party against the dissenters, the Jacobites loudly and to some purpose proclaimed “the Church in danger” under the Hanoverian succession.

But despite these encouraging symptoms, the Jacobites had no great political power. Their wing was more than balanced by the Whimsicals, who in their anxiety

for the Protestant cause were Hanoverian to a man; while the country gentlemen, who formed the bulk of the Tory party, were undecided in their views and could not be depended on to support the Chevalier. They hated Whigs and Nonconformists, they likewise abhorred Germans; but they also dreaded Popery and were decidedly averse from having a sovereign imposed by France. The very necessity of dictating terms to James Edward clashed with their theory of divine right. The country districts, moreover, were never prompt in organising and executing a rebellion; the towns and centres of industrial activity—the growing and progressive element—sided with the Whigs. The Chevalier himself found no difficulty in believing that the Tories as a body were devoted to his cause; even the article in the Peace of Utrecht stipulating for his removal from France failed to shake his confidence in the ministry.¹ Harley's bold stroke of creating twelve peers caused him the keenest delight, for he argued that "when men of low fortunes are introduced into the nobility, they must by some means keep up their port; this puts them in a state of dependency, and those that best support their grandeur will always be surest of their service."² The oscillations of Harley seem on the whole to have encouraged the Jacobites. Lockhart read goodwill towards the Chevalier in his appointment of the Duke of Hamilton as ambassador to France, a project which was however frustrated by the Duke's death in a duel with Lord Mohun in 1712; also Harley granted pensions to several of the Highland chiefs, to support their clans in arms for the government—a measure which, as Lockhart observes, "did admit of another construction."³

¹ *Memoirs of John, Duke of Melfort, from the Miscellany of the Spottiswoode Society*, ii. 407 et seq.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Lockhart Papers*, i. 376.

The Peace of Utrecht was signed on April 16, 1713.¹ Having laid the diplomatic ghost which had haunted him so long, Bolingbroke turned with renewed energy to the task of consolidating the Tories. Whigs were rapidly dislodged from the army and civil posts,² to make room for his own partisans. But he was paralysed by the incompetent Oxford, who intrigued with every party by turns and was false to all. Bolingbroke saw that the removal of his leader must be the first step, and began to force the game. With the double object of binding the Church party to his side, and at the same time of placing Oxford in a dilemma, he pushed the Schism Act through Parliament, which aimed a deadly blow at the Nonconformists by restraining them from educating their children. Oxford became most suspicious of his colleague's intentions, and went so far as to vote with the Whigs against the Commercial Treaty with France which was Bolingbroke's pet project. Swift compared the ministry to "a ship's crew quarrelling in a storm."³ The Whigs, as may be believed, were not slow to profit by the dissensions of their enemies. The Elector was securely enlisted in their interest, and with equal adroitness they branded the Tories with the stigma of Jacobitism. The Protestant succession was voted out of danger "under the present administration" by a bare majority of twelve. In April 1714 they set Schutz on to demand a writ for the Electoral Prince to sit in the House of Lords as Duke of Cambridge—a petition which Anne indignantly refused. In June expired the aged Sophia, balked by so little of her coveted reversion, and

¹ Preliminary articles of peace were agreed upon between England and France on September 27, 1711.

² *Macpherson's Original Papers*, ii. 223, 295, 412.

³ *Some Free Thoughts*.

George Lewis became heir to the throne of England. The vehemence of the Whigs in favour of Hanover had the effect of driving many Tories into the arms of the Jacobites, who could scarcely contain their excitement; but a Proclamation issued suddenly by the Queen and Council, offering a reward of £5,000 for the capture of the Pretender, "mixed their wine with water," in Lockhart's expressive phrase. And now Bolingbroke forged ahead. The Queen dismissed Oxford on July 27, chiefly on feminine grounds.¹ His hands freed, Bolingbroke entertained the Whig leaders at dinner the same evening, in the hope of forming a Coalition. The scheme is said² to have broken down on his refusal to remove the Pretender farther afield, alleging that Anne would never give her consent. Still victory rested with Bolingbroke, as he schemed for a purely Jacobite ministry, with what intentions will never be known but may perhaps be surmised. The cup of triumph, in any case, was shivered as he raised it to his lips. "The Earl of Oxford was removed on Tuesday, the Queen died on Sunday. What a world is this, and how does fortune banter us!" "It is true, my lord," replied Swift, "the events of five days last week might furnish morals for another volume of Seneca."

¹ Erasmus Lewis to Swift, July 27, 1714. Oxford, according to Anne, neglected business, was unintelligible, untruthful, unpunctual, often drunk, ill-mannered, indecent, and disrespectful.

² *Coxe's Walpole*, i. 82.

IV.

James Edward was now in his twenty-seventh year. If he looked back on the roll of English Kings, he might have reflected that no less than six of the number had carried their title at the point of the sword, while two more had been adopted at the ostensible wish of the nation. But all those rulers boasted some qualifications which were not shared by the Chevalier de St. George. There dwelt in him neither the iron will of the Conqueror, nor the fierce energy of Henry the Second; the fourth Henry and the fourth Edward alike possessed a ripe experience of English politics, with the further advantage of having kings of feeble character to oppose. James Edward appealed to the nation neither as a spoilt child, like Charles the Second; nor a deliverer like Dutch William; nor a makeshift like Protestant George. The English monarch whose early vicissitudes may perhaps be compared with his own is Henry the Seventh. The first of the Tudors, at the time of his attainment of the crown, was in his twenty-ninth year. Both had lived for many years in exile; both had to contest the throne with a sovereign who was newly seated, who was unpopular, but whose title had been ratified by Parliament: both had attempted, unsuccessfully, to land with the help of a foreign fleet. The claim of Henry was an exceedingly bad one, but the facts were at least admitted; that of James was the best possible, but by no means undisputed. Here the resemblance between them is at an end. Fortune favoured the Tudor in three important ways: his native kingdom was better

situated than that of James for penetrating into the heart of England; the course of statecraft in his day was comparatively straightforward; and above all there was as yet no Protestant religion. But greater differences, and not fortuitous, fixed a wide gulf between the two. Henry of Richmond was cast in sterner mould. His years of waiting had taught him prudence, tact, and self-reliance; whereas James, who had hitherto been accustomed to look to his friends for everything, never achieved that alert independence which is the hall-mark of success. James issued manifestoes, Henry struck hard; James placed reliance on favourites, Henry was his own Prime Minister; James, in a word, was born to fail, Henry to succeed.

But for all this the Chevalier deserves more attention than is commonly accorded to him. He was not cast for a leading part in the political drama, but for a lesser light he gave his lines creditably; he was not destined to sit on the throne of England, but he was more worthy of it than some who have been more fortunate; he was not a Plantagenet or a Tudor, but he was the best of the Stuarts. Like his father, thoughtful and sincere; like his grandfather, inspiring self-sacrifice in his followers;—he was free from the bigotry which drove the one into exile, and the bad faith which condemned the other to the scaffold. He possessed the graceful manner, without the cynicism, of Charles the Second; the love of learning, without the pedantry, of James the First. He is described at this time¹ as tall, erect and slender, much resembling his uncle Charles the Second in gait, as also in the lines of his face. “Being asked what he most delighted in, he said, ‘It would be to hear wise men discourse upon useful sub-

¹ *A letter from Mr. Lesly to a member of Parliament in London.* (London, 1714).

jects.' He is always cheerful but seldom merry, thoughtful but not dejected, and bears his misfortunes with a visible magnanimity of spirit. He frequents the public devotions, but there is no sort of bigotry about him." Fénelon,¹ in 1709, had testified with enthusiasm to his virtues: affable, prudent, self-reliant, sociable, courageous, full of dignity without haughtiness—"he has a quick apprehension of truth, a sincere love for it, and a perfect relish of that divine virtue which is founded upon a submission to providence: this seems to be the governing principle of his life." Adversity which might have been turned to better account by a greater man, had not been unprofitable to himself; it served to develop the qualities he possessed, if it failed to create others he stood in need of. If he had succeeded quietly to the throne on the death of Anne, it is probable that he would have governed wisely. Nature had implanted in him something of the statesman; nothing, unfortunately, of the conqueror.

Events moved rapidly in England. On the death of Anne, the impulsive Atterbury was with difficulty restrained from proclaiming "James the Third" at Charing Cross. Bolingbroke shrank from so hazardous a step, and the Whigs lost no time in making all secure for the accession of George. An express arrived from Hanover with orders for the dismissal of Bolingbroke. The Whigs came in. Parliament was dissolved. The situation was summarized in Arbuthnot's bitter pun: "*Fuimus Tōres.*"

But now were heard the first mutterings of the storm which was to rage fiercely round the triumphant Whigs, and even to rock the sovereign on his throne. Bolingbroke retired in dudgeon into the country, and

¹ Original letter of Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambray, to the Duke of Beauvilliers, November, 1709 (*Rawlinson MS.*).

while there "felt the general disposition to Jacobitism increase daily among the people of all ranks," and then "began to perceive these general dispositions ripen into resolutions, and to observe some regular workings among many."¹ If George the First had been in league with the Jacobites, he could hardly have done more to advance their prospects. Phlegmatic and tactless by disposition; long accustomed to a court of a very different description from that of England; ignorant of the language, constitution, and temper of the people he was called upon to govern; impatient of literary and aesthetic culture; imbued with a cordial hatred of crowds and splendour;—he was in every way unsuited for his new dignity. He regarded the throne of England purely in the light of a commercial bargain; before his accession he had invariably refused to furnish the secret service money which his advisers declared to be indispensable, and even when the Queen lay dying he shewed supreme indifference to the prospect of succeeding her.² Now that he had come into his kingdom, he made no attempt to calm the fears of the Tories, to learn the language of the people, or to take an interest in the Church. Received on landing with all possible demonstrations of joy, greeted by respectful Ministers and a submissive Parliament, he had only, in order to conciliate popular feeling, to avoid declaring for either party and to regard all Englishmen equally as his subjects. Instead of this, he succeeded within three short months in alienating all whose political existence was not bound up with his stability on the throne.

"The Church in danger" served as a rallying-cry for the party in disgrace; the ex-ministers proclaimed it loudly and persistently; the populace, roused by

¹ *Letter to Wyndham.*

² *Correspondence de Leibnitz avec l'Electrice Sophie*, iii. 76.

their arguments and by the insinuations of the Jacobites, began to assemble in riotous mobs. Defamatory libels were freely circulated against the King and royal family; money too was spread about, and nothing neglected to undermine the new dynasty. The Chevalier's friends in France, assured by Ormonde, Mar, and others that the people were never so well disposed, asked them to name a day for a general rising and a spot for James Edward to land. Berwick thought that if George saw the fire kindled in the four corners of the realm, he would think only of flight. Haste was however imperative, for delay would enable him to raise troops from Holland and Germany and be in a position so crush the Jacobites.¹

A plot depends, for its success, upon the presence of three factors—secrecy, simplicity, and speed. Betrayal is perhaps the most frequent cause of failure; but elaborate plans, which involve simultaneous risings in several districts, or the timely conjunction of troops approaching from different quarters, are extremely liable to miscarry; while every hour of delay adds to the risk of detection. The reciprocal action of these factors is moreover so constant and subtle, that neglect of any one of them commonly proves fatal to all. So at least it was with the Jacobites. The vast number of persons engaged not only precluded secrecy, but involved elaboration of detail, which in turn necessitated delay; from delay arose impatience; from impatience, precipitation; from precipitation, ruin. Such briefly was the sequence of the events now to be described.

The necessity of preserving some appearance of dignity was never lost sight of by the Chevalier. He accordingly retired early in 1713, before the Treaty of Utrecht (with its clause requiring his banishment)

¹ *Mémoires du Maréchal de Berwick*, ii. 227.

came into effect, from Chalons-sur-Marne, where he had resided since the previous September, to Bar-le-Duc in Lorraine. At the news of Anne's death, he hastened *incognito* to Paris, but was induced by de Torcy to return to Bar, and August found him drinking the waters at Plombières. He could not refrain however from issuing a manifesto, declaring that the good intentions of his sister towards him had long been past all doubt, and had only been baffled by her deplorable death. The document may have re-assured the vulgar as to his legitimacy, but was hardly calculated to clear the ex-ministers from suspicion of having designed his restoration. King George was intensely irritated by the abusive references to himself, and denied the Lorraine envoy an audience until James Edward should have been expelled from the Duke's dominions. The Whigs carried the general election early in 1715; from victory they passed to thoughts of revenge, and rumours of impeachment filled the air. Bolingbroke was informed in March of a resolution to pursue him to the scaffold, and fled in disguise to Paris. His ambition muzzled, his pride stung to the quick, his future dark and cheerless, with the instinct of a ruined gambler he staked all that remained to him on a final *coup*. After pledging his word to Stair, the English ambassador in Paris, that he "would enter into no Jacobite engagements," he saw Berwick privately, and before three months had passed interviewed James Edward himself at Commercy.

The stars in their courses had fought against the Chevalier, but their influence was now to be checked by a brilliant meteor. To the service of his new master Bolingbroke brought the acute penetration, the sound judgment, and the ripe experience of the first statesman in Europe. There was need of all these

qualities and more, if the Jacobites were to succeed. James Edward, thanks to his agents, was in his usual state of bewilderment; he talked to Bolingbroke "like a man who expected every moment to set out for England or Scotland, but who did not very well know for which."¹ With characteristic effusiveness he granted a patent of earldom to his new ally, and pressed the seals into his reluctant hands. Bolingbroke returned to Paris, where he found the scum of three kingdoms assembled in the Chevalier's interest—a few, who could read and write, flourishing papers, while the less fortunate conversed in mysterious undertones. There was "no subordination, no order, no concert," nothing but unbounded confidence. This lump he now proceeded to leaven. He plied France for ammunition, Spain for money, Sweden for troops, and corresponded with the leading Jacobites in Great Britain and Ireland. He insisted on the necessity of printing popular declarations which should "be ready to fly about to all parts" upon the Chevalier's arrival in England. But difficulties beset him at every turn. His "plausible appeals to the people" were whittled down into vague and unsatisfying assurances. Louis, having regard to the exhausted condition of France, shrank from lending overt assistance; the Spanish Court was evasive and dilatory; the royal Swede, hard pressed ever since Pultawa, and besieged at this very time in Stralsund, dared not denude himself of troops. Still Bolingbroke persevered. The outlook in England was more encouraging. As soon as foreign aid should be procured, Ormonde by rising in the west was to give the signal for a general revolt. Hopes too were entertained of Marlborough's co-opera-

¹ *Letter to Wyndham.*

tion;¹ he had returned to share in the triumph of the Whigs, but this did not prevent him from sending £2,000 to the Chevalier. The populace voiced their alarm for the safety of the Church in frequent and formidable riots. The army was unpaid and discontented. Even the Whimsicals had turned Jacobites.

Meanwhile the Chevalier, bewildered between his advisers, was chafing at the delay. Berwick urged caution and rashness in the same breath. A memorial² which he sent by the hand of Bolingbroke insists on the "folly" of trusting to the Scots alone, while in a private letter³ he writes, with reference to the Chevalier's prospects: ". . . . but be it as it will, he must go with a little in his pocket rather than not at all, and leave the rest to Providence; his honour is at stake; his friends will give over the game if they think him backward in short, no delay must come from his side." Bolingbroke counselled patience until his plans were matured. James in despair would have levanted with a Dominican monk, who purported to have been sent from Ormonde, but for Bolingbroke's timely discovery that the man was an impostor. On August 1st, a "man of condition" brought despatches from Ormonde and Mar, saying that a Scottish rising would be hopeless without an English one, and that neither could succeed without assistance of arms, money and troops from abroad⁴—nevertheless if James positively commanded them, they would make the attempt; but it could not be till about the middle of September, by which time Parliament would be prorogued. The Chevalier much against his will was thus constrained

¹ Thornton's *Stuart Dynasty*, pp. 234, 237, 248.

² *Mémoires du Maréchal de Berwick*, ii. 231.

³ Berwick to the Chevalier, July 16, 1715. Thornton, p. 229.

⁴ They asked for 500 officers, and at least 4,000 men.

to wait. Bolingbroke redoubled his efforts and wrung from Louis 10,000 arms and 100,000 crowns.¹ Matters seemed at last to be progressing favourably.

But now followed two appalling disasters, which played havoc with the plot. On August 6th, Ormonde, torn between fear and jealousy, arrived without warning in Paris. Bolingbroke was aghast. He had "sounded the Duke's name high" to the French ministers, declaring that Ormonde's appearance in the west of England would be the signal for 20,000 men to rise. His sudden flight dashed these hopes, with the result that "because they had had too good an opinion of the cause, they began to form too bad a one." To cap all, Louis, whose health had long been ailing, grew rapidly worse and expired on September 1st. Fortune a second time had bantered Bolingbroke.

Meanwhile the Chevalier, unknown to his principal advisers, had taken a resolute step. On August 2nd, Mar, acting on secret instructions, left London in disguise and embarked in a small sloop for Scotland. Rallying the chiefs round him at Aboyne on pretence of a hunting party, he appealed for their support in a vigorous speech; and ten days later, on September 6th, proclaimed the Chevalier at Braemar under the title of James the Eighth. As the standard, worked in blue silk by his countess, was being raised, the gilt ball fell from the top of the pole—an omen which was not forgotten by the superstitious Highlanders. Three days later an attempt to surprise Edinburgh Castle proved abortive, the scaling party having loitered in a tavern two hours beyond the appointed time for the assault. The "magnanimous computations" of the Jacobites cost them dear, for the Castle contained nearly all the government stores, and upwards of

¹ *Mémoires du Maréchal de Berwick*, ii. 218.

£100,000 in money. Mar however found himself at the head of close on 10,000 men. Hearing that the English Catholics had risen in Northumberland, he sent a detachment under Mackintosh to their assistance, while he himself got possession of Perth, thus accounting for Scotland north of the Tay.

The government, on hearing of the revolt, declared the Habeas Corpus Act suspended, and offered a reward of £100,000 for the apprehension of the Pretender within the British dominions. The Duke of Argyll was sent from London to Stirling, but with not more than 1,500 men; other English regiments were ordered to join him in Scotland; help was sought from Ireland, and 6,000 troops demanded from the States General by the terms of the Barrier Treaty.

At Bar the Chevalier was eager to set out in person for Scotland. "Violent diseases," he wrote to Bolingbroke on September 23rd, "must have violent remedies, and to use none has in some cases the same effect as to use bad ones." Bolingbroke seems to have felt little or no resentment at finding his counsels over-ridden; he continued to press for supplies, and in the meantime urged patience. The loss of Louis began now to be keenly felt, for the Regent Orleans had no desire to compromise himself either with the Jacobites or the Hanoverians, but to secure the assistance of the successful party in his designs on the throne of France, in the event of the death of the sickly child whose place he filled. He protested his friendship for the Chevalier on paper,¹ but refused Berwick leave to go to Scotland,² and seized, at Stair's instigation, the military stores collected at Havre. In October, Ormonde set out for Devonshire, to try and rouse the West; while the

¹ See his letter to Ormonde, October 21, 1715. *Thornton*, p. 251.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 247, 259.

Chevalier at the same time left Bar for St. Malo, holding himself in readiness to start either for England or Scotland, according to the fortune of Ormonde. The Duke found, however, that the plot had been betrayed by Maclean, and that Wyndham and Lansdowne were under arrest; he landed at Torbay, only to be refused a night's lodging, and returned in discomfiture to France. A few days later he again set sail, but was driven back by a storm. Bolingbroke now began to press James to embark for Scotland without further delay; he undertook to "banter"¹ Stair and his army of spies until the Prince should have sailed, but was clearly apprehensive of danger. The Chevalier loitered, however, about the coast for several weeks more, disguised variously as a servant, a sailor, and a bishop. Finally he set sail from Dunkirk, and landed at Peterhead early in January, 1716. Two months before, the English Catholics had capitulated at Preston, while Mar after the indecisive action of Sheriffmuir had retired to Perth. Here after a slight delay, caused by a severe ague, the Chevalier joined him, impatient for a sight of "those little kings with their armies," who had filled his dreams for so long. It was a sad awakening. In place of the 16,000 eager warriors who had figured in Mar's despatches, he found less than a third of that number, ill-armed, ill-disciplined, ill-fed, and dispirited by the long weeks of inaction. At his very coronation it was deemed imprudent to hold a review of the troops, lest their reduced numbers and pitiable plight should tend still further to depress them. Perth was little more than a village, defended by a simple wall. Mar had no engineers, no tools or materials even; fortification was clearly out of the question. There was nothing for it but to retreat at the approach of the enemy: this had in fact been

¹ Bolingbroke to the Chevalier, Nov. 15, 1715. *Thornton*, p. 262.

decided upon¹ a month before the Chevalier arrived. Argyll, reinforced by men and supplies, marched out from Stirling on February 9th, and reached Tullibardine, eight miles from Perth, on the 11th. James fell back on Montrose with part of his troops; the rest he sent to Brechin. On Argyll's approach, he left his army to the command of General Gordon, and embarked for France with Mar and several others. Argyll speedily snuffed out the last flicker of revolt, and another fiasco was added to the Chevalier's record.

Failure can always be accounted for more easily than success. The "Fifteen" was delayed too long, and then only prosecuted in half-hearted fashion. Bolingbroke's plans were too comprehensive, Mar's were not comprehensive enough. Again, there were too many managers. Bolingbroke squabbled with Ormonde; Mar thought to outwit them both; while James was dragged by turns at the heels of all three. Nevertheless, if Mar had been "thorough," he could not be blamed for his precipitation: reinforcements from abroad would of course have been invaluable, but time was more invaluable still. Obviously, while preparations in England were chaotic, the Scots had a golden opportunity of winning another battle of Newburn; but instead of opposing Argyll's advance, Mar lingered aimlessly in Perth and allowed the various hostile detachments to become united. Such feeble tactics were particularly ill-advised in the case of Highlanders, whose courage far exceeded their obedience to discipline. To come to blows as soon as possible, then to retire and deposit booty with their friends, they considered the acme of military science. What they most needed was a capable general, to preserve order and give them confidence by successful exploits. The presence of Berwick alone would have worked won-

¹ Letter from an Officer in James' army. *Carte Papers*.

ders:¹ accompanied by regular troops, he could hardly have failed to carry all before him. It is even doubtful if Argyll meant to keep faith with George. Many of the rebels were his personal friends and there was always the danger that he might lose his seignorial rights over some of them, if their estates were forfeited. He had been suspected before this of Jacobite leanings, and two years later attempts were renewed to gain him over to their cause. On the present occasion his conduct was deemed pusillanimous at Court; he was deprived of his command and recalled to London.

Nevertheless, on the whole, the Chevalier was most to blame—not indeed because his servants bungled, but because he himself ran no risk of bungling. Throughout the proceedings he is a cypher. Interest centres on the baffled energy of Bolingbroke, the jealous vanity of Ormonde, or the reckless incompetence of Mar. James seems to have been incapable of acting for himself; he hesitated between different counsellors and was lost. A resolute man who made success his sole object would have staked all on one determined venture; James did not even arrive on the scene till all was virtually over, and then failed to show any spirit himself, let alone animate his followers. “Our men,” wrote one of the rebels,² “began to despise him; some asked if he could speak; his countenance looked extremely heavy; he cared not to come abroad among us soldiers, or to see us handle our arms or do our exercise.” We can believe that the raw Highland levies compared unfavourably with the household troops of France; but if the capacity of inspiring confidence is not to be looked for in a

¹ See a letter from the Chevalier to Bolingbroke, January 2, 1716. *Thornton*, p. 264.

² *A True Account of the Proceedings at Perth; the Debates in the Secret Council there; with the Reasons and Causes of the suddain breaking up of the Rebellion. Written by a Rebel* (London, 1716).

commander, then the art of generalship has been much overrated. This second miscarriage rendered the Chevalier's cause hopeless; he might well have desisted from further plots, each punier than the last, and all of which from their inception bore equally the stamp of failure.

James Edward debarked, with his little train, at Boulogne¹ on February 22nd, and proceeded to St. Germain. Here he received Bolingbroke, who had been in constant communication with him during his absence, and who had never relaxed his efforts to obtain supplies. The interview was cordial on both sides, and at its conclusion the Chevalier agreed to return at once to Lorraine. Instead of doing so, however, he went to the little house in the Bois de Boulogne where his female ministers resided; a few days later he abruptly dismissed his sole capable adviser, and transferred the seals to Mar. This amazing act of folly was probably the work of the "Madrid" Junto: they hated Bolingbroke for his studied neglect of their services, and vamped up charges of spending the Chevalier's money on his own pleasures. Ormonde, too, had always been jealous of his brilliant colleague, while Mar wanted to be sole minister. It was the Chevalier's loss, however, for Bolingbroke's genius was now needed more than ever. Both Orleans and the Duke of Lorraine were feeling their way with Great Britain: the Duke advised the Chevalier to go to Deux Ponts, promising however to receive him if the Swiss King refused. Much discouraged, James repaired to the Papal State of Avignon, where he was joined by Ormonde, Mar, and other refugees. Early in the autumn fresh negotiations were afoot. Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, whose quarrel with George the First over Bremen and Verden was at

¹ Thornton claims to have settled this point. *Stuart Dynasty*, p. 272.

its height, had serious thoughts of helping the Chevalier to the throne of England. Attempts were made to reconcile Charles with Peter the Great, whose interests also conflicted with those of George in northern Germany. Baron Gortz travelled from Stockholm to the Hague, and corresponded with Count Gyllenborg, Swedish ambassador in London, and through him with the principal English Jacobites; while Ormonde hastened to Russia as plenipotentiary of the Pretender. While these plans were maturing, Great Britain by a judicious mixture of coercion and conciliation concluded a treaty with France, which was signed in November, 1716. The exclusion of Philip and his heirs from the throne of France was confirmed, and the succession guaranteed to Orleans if Louis the Fifteenth died without children; in return for this it was provided that the Pretender should not be allowed to reside in France, Lorraine, or Avignon. The Regent kept faith. Through his spies the machinations of Gortz were discovered, and the arrest of that intriguer produced a temporary lull. In January, 1717, a further diplomatic triumph fell to Great Britain, when the league with France, by the accession of the States General, was extended into the Triple Alliance. George next endeavoured to assuage the jealousy of the Emperor, who was also interested in Bremen and Verden, with the result that in July, 1718, a treaty was concluded between England, France, and Austria on the basis of Utrecht, to be known from the subsequent accession of the Dutch as the Quadruple Alliance.

The Chevalier, upon the Regent's promising to pay his debts, had easily been induced to cross the Alps. He was dividing his time between Urbino and Rome, when a new ally came to the rescue. Cardinal Alberoni, supreme in Spain over the feeble Philip, finding his

designs on Austria hampered by the policy of Great Britain,¹ gathered up the threads which had fallen from the hand of Gortz. His prodigious energy evolved a formidable plot. Charles the Twelfth was to invade Scotland at the head of 10,000 Swedes; the Czar was to furnish ships, and Spain money. Simultaneously a combined force of 80,000 Swedes and Russians was to pour into Germany. It was the fate, however, of Alberoni constantly to be planning expeditions and to fail in all his enterprises. The Spanish fleet, after seizing Sicily, was destroyed by Byng off Cape Passaro; while the death of Charles in the trenches before Frederikshall put an end to all hope of assistance from Sweden. But the restless and sanguine Cardinal at once conceived a fresh plot. Spain was to fit out an armament for the invasion of England—Ormonde to take command, and most of the exiles of the "Fifteen" to participate. To Madrid accordingly in February, 1719, the Chevalier repaired from Rome, outwitting the Imperialists by a simple stratagem. Mar and others of his suite having set out in a northerly direction were arrested at Voghera, in the confident belief that the Chevalier was of the party,² and conveyed to the castle of Milan. James himself in the meantime embarked secretly at the little port of Nettuno, and after touching at Cagliari landed safely at Rosas. From thence he proceeded to Madrid, while his imprisoned adherents, upon the discovery of the error, were of course released.

Philip the Fifth and his Queen acknowledged their visitor as King of Great Britain, and placed the palace of Buen Retiro at his disposal. A formidable squadron

¹ In 1716 Great Britain had formally guaranteed the integrity of the Emperor's dominions by the Treaty of Westminster.

² Stair reported to the British government that the Pretender had at last been arrested.

sailed from Cadiz,¹ to pick up Ormonde and James Edward at Corunna. Once more however the "Protestant wind" intervened in favour of Great Britain: a terrific storm off Cape Finisterre disabled the greater portion of the fleet, and compelled it to return to Cadiz. Ignorant of the disaster, the Earl Marischal sailed with 300 Spanish troops from St. Sebastian, and landed in the Isle of Lewis, where he was joined by his brother, James Keith, and other Scottish peers. Their efforts to rouse the Highlands were attended with scant success, the clansmen having been "too heartilie bitt" on previous occasions to join in any numbers. General Wightman attacked the small band of insurgents on the evening of the 10th of June; after a smart engagement the Highlanders were dislodged from their position and scattered in all directions, while the Spaniards surrendered on the following morning and were taken to Edinburgh as prisoners of war. Ormonde appeared off the coast of Brittany with the remnants of the Spanish fleet, but made no attempt to land in England. The British Government was fully prepared to crush the least semblance of revolt, 2000 men having been received from Holland together with six battalions of Imperialists from the Austrian Netherlands, while an offer of twenty battalions from the Regent Orleans was declined. Cobham destroyed the remains of the Spanish navy at Vigo, and Spain adhered shortly after to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. Even the quarrel between George the First and his son, which the Jacobites had zealously traded upon, was made up in 1720. The Whigs, who had been steadily consolidating their power since the passage of the Septennial Bill, were now more than ever

¹ It consisted of five men-of-war, and about 20 transports, having on board 5000 soldiers, with arms for 30,000 more.

² *Lockhart Memoirs*, ii, 19.

determined to resist to the full all endeavours to overturn the Hanoverian dynasty. Despite an undercurrent of discontent which found expression in spasmodic outbreaks, it became more evident every day that Jacobitism was numbered with the lost causes, and that no effectual step would or could be taken towards the accomplishment of a Stuart restoration.

V.

The Chevalier, after entering upon marriage negotiations with half the Courts of Europe,¹ finally became betrothed to Clementina Maria, daughter of Prince James Sobieski, eldest son of John, King of Poland. The match was not without an element of romance, for the Princess loved as a child to be called by her companions Queen of England; and the ladies of the Court, seeing her pleasure in the title, continued playfully to call her so.² On her way to join the Chevalier, Clementina was arrested by order of the Emperor, and confined for some weeks at Innsbruck. After a dramatic escape in April, 1719, she was married at Bologna on May 28th by proxy, James still being absent in Madrid; but the ceremony was completed as soon as he returned. Old year's night, 1720, witnessed the birth of Charles Edward, and in 1725 Clementina presented James with a second son, Henry Benedict, the future Cardinal York.

The throne to which he blindly aspired forever bulked large in the Chevalier's thoughts. To the Marquis of Blandford, who expressed astonishment at his knowledge of English families, he explained that the laws, customs, and families of his country had received his careful attention, "that he might not be reputed a stranger, when the Almighty pleased to call him

¹ Daughters of the Duke of Marlborough, the Regent Orleans, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Modena, the Czar, Charles XII. of Sweden, and the Landgrave of Hesse, had been proposed at different times.

² *Narrative of the Seizure, Escape, and Marriage of the Princess Clementina Sobieski, as it was particularly set down by Mr. Charles Wogan.* (London, 1722).

thither.”¹ His affairs in England were now managed by a Junto of five—Arran, Orrery, Gower, North and Atterbury; Ormonde was his agent in Spain; General Dillon, an Irish rebel, in France. Early in the year 1722 a fresh attempt at invasion was contemplated, Lansdowne commanding in Cornwall, Strafford in the north, while Arran was commissioned General of all England and Ireland. James writes to Atterbury on January 3, 1722: “The reasons against delay are unanswerable, and the appearance of success is no doubt very great:”² but three months later laments the failure of the intended enterprise “for want of money, and from being pursued on too small a bottom, and without the concurrence of a greater number of friends.”³ The English Jacobites next endeavoured to convert Oxford to their views, but without success; the strain of imprisonment with constant dread of impeachment had disabled the ex-minister for purposes of intrigue. Further, owing to the network of British alliances, there seemed little or no prospect of raising the 5000 troops from abroad, whose presence Atterbury always insisted on as the only sound basis of a Jacobite revolt. A plot was hatched, however, for seizing the Tower, Bank, Exchequer, and other places where money was lodged, and proclaiming James Edward in different parts of the Kingdom. As soon as George went to Hanover, the Chevalier was to embark for Spain, and from thence sail to England. Not to excite suspicion by his sudden absence, he retired from Rome to a villa. But the plot was prematurely discovered—partly through Orleans, to whom the conspiritors had applied for 5000 men—partly through the treachery of Mar. “Bobbing John”

¹ An English traveller at Rome to his father, May 6, 1721.

² *Stuart Papers* (ed. Glover, 1847), I. App., p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, App., pp. 7-8.

as usual had a foot in both camps; he accepted office from the Pretender and emolument from the British Government. His pension of £3000 was at this time ostentatiously withdrawn, probably as a blind, for the Government contrived to get information of the Chevalier's most secret counsels. Three letters from Atterbury were intercepted and accurately deciphered, together with a still more incriminating missive sent by Mar, in defiance of all practice, through the common post. This last, though not actually referring to Atterbury by name, contained allusions to his wife's death, his gout, and other circumstances which unmistakeably denoted the prelate.¹ On this evidence Atterbury was exiled, while Layer, a young barrister who had been implicated in the plot, was executed. Judicially examined, the whole scheme appeared so preposterous that Layer's counsel declared it "rather to be a chimerical plan of some crazy-pated politicians than a solid project of any man of sense."² For more than twenty years after this miserable imbroglio, there was no party in England desirous of bringing in the Pretender; henceforward the Jacobites became merged in the band of "Patriots" opposed to Walpole.

James had Mar quietly removed from all concern in his affairs. The seals he transferred to Colonel Hay, titular Earl of Inverness, who had in reality discharged all the duties of the office since Mar left Rome in 1719. Hay, described by Lockhart as "a cunning, false, avaritious creature of very ordinary parts," represented the peculiar order of which Carr and Villiers were earlier types. He and his wife were lodged in the palace,

¹ See a letter from James Murray to the Chevalier. *Stuart Papers*. i. 83, note.

² Hungerford for Layer. *The Trial of Christopher Layer*—All Souls' Library.

much to the disgust of Clementina, who complained loudly of their insolence. The Chevalier paying no heed to these remonstrances, domestic friction became more and more aggravated, until the Princess declared that she would "rather suffer death than live in the King's palace with persons that have no religion, honour, nor conscience,"¹ and retired into the convent of St. Cecilia. The course of this long quarrel presents many small points, which at the time seemed of importance. It filled months and years with petty bickerings, by no means confined to the parties primarily concerned, but reacting on ecclesiastical intrigues in Rome and the policy of the Vatican. Without dwelling at length on the parts played by Hay, Ramsay and Sheridan, or the tactics of Mrs. Sheldon and Mrs. Hughes, it must be obvious that James and Clementina were wholly unsuited to each other. Such a "child-wife" could have found little in common with a husband soured by disappointment, but never slackening in the mechanical pursuit of fresh chimeras. Doubtless her irritation was kindled by the jealousies of her women and the half-Protestant education of her son, while suspicions of the Chevalier's misconduct with Lady Inverness may well have fanned it into flame. Whether these suspicions were justified is at least open to doubt. James Edward, though very far from being immaculate, was by no means innately vicious. At Bar le Duc he had however kept a mistress, and he neither admitted nor denied adultery with Mrs. Hay. He addressed his wife in affectionate terms, imploring her to return to him, but she insisted on the removal of the Hays. It had been the aim of Mar, for some months before his own dismissal, to have Hay removed from about the person of the Chevalier, and James thought that he

¹ *Lockhart Papers*, ii. 265.

might be in league with the Queen. Further, Clementina's letters savoured strongly of Cardinal Alberoni, who was endeavouring to ingratiate himself with the Pope; and the attempts of the Catholics to banish Dunbar, the Protestant tutor of Charles Edward, always aroused the Chevalier's keen resentment. Meanwhile he considered himself deeply wronged by his wife's behaviour. "I shall always be ready," he wrote, "to forgive the Queen, whenever she will live with me as a wife ought to do; yet I would not purchase even my restoration at the price of being her slave." This attitude of dignified remonstrance he maintained, although the Pope continued to press for Dunbar's dismissal, threatening even to deprive James of his pension.¹ The quarrel was, however, producing the worst effect on his affairs; it alienated the Courts of Venice and Madrid, and made a disagreeable impression on his adherents in Great Britain. Reconciliation became necessary for his schemes, which depended on help from Spain and the Emperor. Philip the Fifth, disappointed in his hopes of a double Bourbon marriage, was playing false to the Quadruple Alliance; while the Emperor had become embroiled with England and Holland over his East India Company at Ostend. Ripperda, who had replaced Alberoni in Spain, was despatched accordingly to Vienna, where a treaty was concluded between the two countries with a secret clause for restoring the Pretender. In February, 1726, James was able to write to Lockhart: "I have had for some time reason to hope the best from my applications to the Court of Vienna, where I find the Emperor's interest as well as his inclinations may soon lead him to espouse my restoration in a very particular manner." The young Duke of Wharton, who had once before joined the Chevalier only to abjure him, was now

¹ *Stuart Papers*, i. 314, 15.

again wandering from court to court with the busy air of an agent for his new master. In the course of these political rambles Wharton came to Vienna, just at the time when Ripperda was talking loudly of sending George back to his German principality. To the Spanish minister he accordingly adhered like a limpet, following him back to Madrid, and never ceasing to urge the Chevalier's claims until his importunity seemed likely to be rewarded.

But Ripperda had no real desire to do more than alarm the British Government, and dissolve the new treaty of Hanover.¹ With this object he showered threats and promises upon Colonel Stanhope, the English ambassador at Madrid, and made mysterious disclosures of Spanish designs upon Gibraltar. Stanhope however proved most unaccommodating; he not only refused to be frightened or even impressed by these revelations, but began to ask inconvenient questions about the troops which were being drawn to the coast of Biscay and the arms stored in Cadiz. Ripperda grew more and more embarrassed. He denied all knowledge of Wharton's doings, and pretended that the troops were being raised in self-defence, to ward off a meditated English descent upon the Spanish ports. Of the arms in Cadiz he professed complete ignorance, a blunder which Stanhope promptly turned to account by affecting to believe that they belonged to private persons. Having found where they had been left in pledge for a certain sum, pending a remittance from the Chevalier, he himself redeemed them and had them shipped off to England. Ripperda had, of course, no remedy, and the absurd plot dissolved into thin air—the native element of Jacobite conspiracies.

¹ Concluded between France, England and Prussia, September 25, 1726.

At the end of the year 1726 the Chevalier went to Bologna, with bright hopes of "a longer journey" in the near future. The Emperor's attitude furnished great expectations; while Louis the Fifteenth, under the guidance of Cardinal Fleury, appeared far more promising than the late Regent. In July, 1727, came the news of the sudden death of George the First. James sent expresses to Paris, Vienna and Madrid, setting out in person for Lorraine. As usual, however, all ended in smoke. Foreign negotiations came to nothing: not a man stirred in England or Scotland. The Chevalier retired once more to Avignon: once more he was dislodged by French influence, and compelled to return to Italy.

Here he was joined by Clementina, who had prevailed upon him to part with Hay. In October, 1730, we find James again complaining of his wife's conduct and praying for "some prudent means of separation;" but the traveller Polnitz¹ records having seen them living together in Rome a year later, to all appearance in perfect harmony. However this may have been, the unhappy quarrel had robbed life of all pleasure for Clementina; she relapsed into moodiness, and died early in 1735. The Chevalier resigned himself to a quiet life in Rome, his mornings being passed in prayer near his wife's tomb.² The Pope allowed him a bodyguard, and he was treated in all respects with the consideration due to a monarch recognised as such. English travellers were always sure of a welcome at his table, and he succeeded in making himself agreeable to most of those who came in contact with him.

With France and England at peace, Austria apa-

¹ *Polnitz Memoirs*, ii. 60. (ed. 1737).

² Charles de Brosse, *L'Italie il y a cent ans*, p. 95.

thetic, and Spain almost bankrupt, the chances of a Jacobite revival were for many years inappreciable. But by the death of the Emperor Charles the Sixth, the way was cleared for Frederick the Great to rob the neighbour whom he had promised to defend, and thereby to give the signal for another European upheaval. The English nation also, profoundly fatigued with twenty years of Walpole, and eager to avenge Jenkins, was clamouring for war with Spain. To this period belongs the story of Walpole's intrigue with the Chevalier, through the person of Carte, the Jacobite historian. Any detailed discussion as to the grounds of the case against Walpole would lie beyond the scope of this essay, but Mr. Morley's defence¹ of the minister must be said to read lamely. If Walpole desired to "hedge" in temporary fear of a Stuart restoration, we may credit him with sufficient astuteness not to commit himself beyond indefinite verbal messages. Lord Mahon's suggestion that Walpole, in order to provide himself with a retreat, shewed the Chevalier's letter to George the Second, is of course incapable of proof; but it at least evinces a penetrating insight into the character of that statesman. Whatever James thought of the affair, he had the good sense not to rely on Walpole's co-operation. "It does not seem to me," he wrote to an agent in Paris, "that Walpole has any serious intentions of helping the cause, unless he is forced to do so in his own private interests; and the less the subject is worked on, the better."²

Without assistance, however, from political adventurers in England, Jacobitism experienced another of those spasmodic eruptions which usually synchronised with disorder in Europe. Of the former protagonists,

¹ *Walpole*, by John Morley, pp. 229-233.

² The Chevalier to O'Brien, March 23, 1740. The letter is printed in *Prince Charles Edward Stuart*, by Andrew Lang, p. 46.

Mar, Wharton and Atterbury were dead ; but the Earl Marischal returned to the charge. In March, 1740, he gratefully accepted a commission from James as Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, and displayed considerable energy in consulting with Ormonde and Montemar as to means of obtaining help from Spain. These inquiries served only to reveal the hopelessly crippled state of Spanish finances. Thoroughly disheartened, the Earl resigned and retired into private life. His brother, James Keith, was no more successful in his attempts to corrupt the Duke of Argyle, although the veteran general continued to be suspected of Jacobitism by the English Court, until his death in 1743. Lord Orrery, however, who took a fitful interest in the exiled house, resuscitated the Junto of Five.¹ Colonel Cecil flitted busily between England and the Continent, stirring up confederates for the cause. Two Highland lairds, Balhaldy and John Murray of Broughton, undertook the campaign in Scotland, keeping in touch always with the English conspirators. It was only indeed by the sustained efforts of these two men that the "Forty-Five" was made possible at all ; for the Junto in England confined their activity to negotiations, and not one of them ever struck a blow for the Pretender. Jealousy as usual checked the current of intrigue ; the Junto squabbled among themselves and drifted gradually apart. George the Second, after his conduct at Dettingen,² found himself not far removed from popularity. Parliament passed a Bill of Attainder against the Chevalier's sons—which was to extend even to the posterity of their adherents—if the Princes should land in Britain. This was followed by the arrest of Colonel Cecil and strict

¹ The other members were the Duke of Beaufort, Sir Watkin Wynne, Sir John Hinde Cotton, and Lord Barrymore.

² June, 1743.

enforcement of the laws against Catholics and Non-Jurors.

Early in 1743 died Cardinal Fleury, but Tencin, who succeeded him, owed to James his hat and never forgot to be grateful. It was not long before he proposed that Charles Edward should visit France, with a view to obtaining help from Louis the Fifteenth; and the departure of the Prince upon a pretended hunting exhibition laid the train of the "Forty-Five." We make no attempt to follow the fortunes of Charles in his native kingdom, nor to pierce the mystery of his subsequent wanderings on the continent, in pursuance of his "system" of holding no intercourse with Rome. It would be equally beyond our scope to tell of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; of the arrest of Charles, and his expulsion from France; of the spy Pickle and the Elibank plot; and of Dr. King² veiling treasonable sentiments in the obscurity of a learned language. A word, however, on the strange reversal of Stuart policy by the Young Pretender may not be out of place. The goodwill of France, hitherto the principal asset of the exiled house, Charles after his return from Scotland deliberately forfeited; he refused a pension from Louis the Fifteenth, shewed signs of renouncing Catholicism, and strove ostentatiously to identify himself with the fortunes of England. In Paris he openly rejoiced in the victories of the English fleet, and caused commemorative medals to be struck, bearing his head on one side, and on the reverse ships, with the motto *Amor et Spes Britanniae*. This change of attitude caused James much uneasiness: it was hopeless for the future to intrigue

² Dr. King, Principal of St. Mary Hall, Oxford, was a notorious Jacobite. He delivered the famous *redeat ille* speech at the opening of the Radcliffe Library. See *Studies in Oxford History, chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, by J. R. Green and G. Robertson, p. 300.

with foreign courts, whose sympathy had of course proceeded solely from a desire to embarrass Great Britain. He thought Charles was trying to purchase popularity in England at the expense of filial piety and religious obligation. Charles seems not unreasonably to have regarded the traditional policy as futile and antiquated; the English people had never been willing to receive a king from the national enemy, nor were they inclined to do so now. But the bid for a restoration from within came too late; after the failure of the "Fifteen" the Stuart cause was played out. If James upon the death of Anne had boldly declined assistance from France, at the same time renouncing Catholicism, in all human probability he would have regained the throne of his fathers peacefully and speedily. By 1750, however, all chance of success had vanished long ago, and further persistence in pursuit of the unattainable shewed mere stupid disregard of accomplished facts.

The departure of Charles for the "Forty-Five" may justly be said to close the political career of James Edward. Anxious to lay down the burden of mock-sovereignty, the Old Pretender confided to Louis the Fifteenth his intention of resigning in favour of Charles. For twenty years more he lived on in Rome in feeble health, and neglected by his favourite son. There are few more touching spectacles in history than this melancholy old age, with its cravings for affection, passionate but unsatisfied—old age querulous of grievances, but its grievances were griefs and struck the heart. "Enthusiasm and disappointment," writes Horace Walpole in 1752, "have stamped a solemnity on his person, which rather creates pity than respect." For several years before his death the Chevalier lived in great retirement. "He sees very few people and speaks little," says

Sir Horace Mann¹ in 1759, "and upon the whole is looked upon to be in very great decay." Again² in 1760, "He seems of late totally indifferent to all affairs both of a public or of a domestic nature, and leaves the management of both to his son the Cardinal, and Mr. Grimes (John Graham); he cannot bear the fatigue of talking."

Meanwhile in England, George the Second was quietly succeeded by his grandson; not a shadow of disaffection obscured the claim of the new ruler. "Even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, saw something to flatter their favourite prejudices; and to justify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The person and cause of the Pretender were become contemptible; his title disowned throughout Europe, his party disbanded in England."³ During the last five years of his life, James Edward was confined to his room by increasing infirmities; on January 12th, 1766 he expired, and his remains were interred with regal pageantry beneath the dome of St. Peter's.

¹ Sir Horace Mann to Secretary of State, January, 1759, *Decline of the last Stuarts*. Roxburghe Club.

² *Ibid*, November, 1760.

³ Burke's *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*.

VI.

In estimating the importance of any one historical figure, the temptation to exalt him unduly is a subtle one. The biographer more commonly assumes the functions of an advocate than of a judge, content that shadowy merits may be advantageously displayed, and substantial foibles dexterously concealed. King John, for example, is no longer to be deemed the crude embodiment of cowardice and deceit, but rather a model of astute if primitive statesmanship; Richard the Third must not be too harshly judged for actions which he thought little of at the time: for Cromwell is claimed the tribute of praise due to a humanitarian and a patriot; Walpole is set up as an honest minister and a good servant of his country. Rehabilitation is not without its uses, and often enough represents very much more than the mere swing of the pendulum. In the case however of James Edward, any attempt at historical "window-dressing" could only appear ridiculous. The Old Pretender may have been unduly extolled by his friends, or unjustly decried by his enemies; but he seems, regarded impartially, to have made a singularly unimpressive figure. Attention is never focussed upon his personality, but strays from one to another of his *personnel*; he himself is merely the thread upon which the imposing beads are strung. The beads will always fascinate by their variety and intrinsic worth; the thread is interesting only in so far as it serves to keep them together and before our eyes. The name of James Edward conjures

up memories of a proud and ancient race, struggling to regain its lost independence; of brave men perishing on the scaffold; of ambitious statesmen, scheming cardinals and powerful kings. But with the central figure we are little concerned; he never makes us feel "what shadows we are, and what shadows we pursue." Enthusiasm wanes and grows cold in the study of a life that was lived by others.

The Old Pretender appears to have suffered chiefly from a chronic languor—an inability, as it were, to take an intelligent interest in the conduct of his own affairs, or to control the conflicting designs of his various agents. He has none of the stout and lively energy, none of the resolute and imperious vigour that mark the man of action and the conqueror. It was not so much that his mind became atrophied for want of collision and excitement, but rather that he weakly shrank from the effort of supervision. As early as 1715, when he should have had precise and definite plans, his incoherent explanations to Bolingbroke reveal an incapacity half ludicrous, half pathetic. In Scotland, his demeanour depressed the troops; at Perth, when the news of Argyll's approach was brought to him, he is reported to have shed tears. Contact with the world served only to increase his irresolution and apathy, until finally his pretensions became the laughing stock of Europe. Keysler¹ relates how, upon the Pope's issuing an order that all his subjects should style James Edward King of England, the Italians turned it to ridicule by calling him "the local King" or "King here," while they referred to George the Second as "King there." To afford an easy mark for ridicule, as it requires no wizard to say, is the outward token of a feeble will and often of a cowardly

¹ *Travels through Germany*, English Translation, ii. 284.

nature. The Chevalier was not deficient in physical courage, but morally he was a coward. He dared not let it be known to his principal advisers that he had commissioned Mar to open the "Fifteen;" he neither had the courage to upbraid Bolingbroke to his face, nor to silence the Trants and Oglethorpes behind his back. Double-dealing more commonly denotes a knave than a fool; but James Edward by a chaotic combination of both became the dupe of his own cunning. Yet in spite of bad faith, of wavering resolutions, and of blind submission to favourites, the Stuarts somehow inspired a spirit of self-sacrifice—there was that in the depths of their nature which touched a chord not often set vibrating, and which has endeared their memory to thousands whose feelings of attachment defy analysis.

Not to insist at greater length upon the Chevalier's faults of character, which are sufficiently obvious, two powerful causes may be noticed which militated against his chance of success. In the first place, his restoration was never desired for its own sake. In England his pretensions formed a rallying-ground for a discredited and declining faction; but as soon as it became evident that the Whigs were in earnest, the hopes of James Edward rapidly expired. That his cause should ever have appeared to flourish was not due to his own enterprise or sagacity, but to the almost incredible folly of his opponents. Similarly, while help from abroad was indispensable to his schemes, no foreign court was keenly enlisted in his interests. Louis the Fourteenth, "the best friend the Chevalier ever had,"¹ saw in him nothing more than a convenient weapon to turn against England; while after the death of Louis he was blown like an idle bubble about Europe,

¹ Bolingbroke, *Letter to Wyndham*.

at the mercy of every breath of intrigue. Nobody shewed him kindness for his own sake, or unselfishly advanced his prospects.

Secondly, the activity of the British Government everywhere undermined his plans, not only by concluding treaties with his principal allies, but by intercepting with the utmost regularity a large proportion of Jacobite correspondence. "The Rebels," wrote Lord Chesterfield,¹ "who have fled to France and elsewhere, think only of their public acts of rebellion, believing that the Government is not aware of their secret cabals whereas on the contrary it is fully informed of them. It sees two-thirds of their letters: they betray one another; and I have often had the very same man's letters in my hand at once, some to try to make his peace at home, and others to the Pretender." Lockhart, astounded to find the contents of his most private letters well known to the Government, was answered, "What is proof against the money of Great Britain?"² There can be no doubt that the feeling of insecurity produced by these disclosures proved a most effectual solvent of Jacobite conspiracies.

Another difficulty that will occur to everyone was that of obtaining sufficient funds to enable a disowned Prince not only to keep up some appearance of royalty, but also to finance numerous designs for his restoration. Despite his general lack of business-like methods, James Edward shewed surprising facility in the art of making both ends meet. "The most apparent merit," writes Horace Walpole, "of the Chevalier's Court is the great regularity of his finances and economy of his exchequer. His income before the Rebellion (of 1745) was £25,000 a year, arising chiefly from pensions from the Pope and

¹Works, iii. 207.

²Lockhart *Memoirs*, ii. 400.

from Spain; from contributions from England, and some irregular donations from other courts: yet his payments were not only most exact, but he had saved a large sum of money which was squandered on the unfortunate attempt in Scotland." Clementina, of course, brought to her husband the dowry of one of the richest heiresses in Europe, while the present of £2000 from Marlborough and the remission of his debts by Orleans have already been mentioned. Among other random contributions was a generous response from John Law, upon the Chevalier's appealing¹ for the "favour and bounty" of the promoter of the Mississippi Company; and Dubois a year later sent 50,000 crowns for his nomination by James Edward to the cardinalate. It would appear on the whole that the Pretender was amply provided with the necessaries of life; even so, for a Stuart to have lived within his income implied a distinct conquest over influences of heredity, and must accordingly be set down to his credit.

With this exception, the Chevalier's "blood and judgment" appear to have been most unhappily commingled. The force of circumstances exposed him in a peculiar degree to vicissitudes which a hero may control, but which are apt to loom large in presence of weakly natures. An irksome dependence on charity not always charitably extended; the strain of opening or closing negotiations as the English Government concluded treaties; the hardship of constantly seeking some fresh asylum, to be as constantly dislodged;—all this, coupled at first with the task of controlling jealous adherents, later of easing domestic friction, and aggravated always by the necessity of preserving his dignity, imposed an intolerable burden. Nor should it be forgotten that in the shipwreck of his hopes a full part was

¹ Pretender to Law. August 5, 1719.

borne by the inscrutable workings of nature; his armaments were dispersed by storms, and his friends removed by death. In following such a record of broken hopes and unrelieved failure, the initial sense of disappointment yields gradually to a more temperate compassion. There is an indefinable pathos in the spectacle of this tragedy-king, parading his solemn travesty of sovereignty before an unromantic and imperturbable audience. When it is remembered that he lived to see no less than five sovereigns on the English throne, all of whom he had been taught to regard as usurpers, it may help towards understanding how deeply the iron must have entered into his soul.

After this, it may appear paradoxical to claim that the career of James Edward is of supreme historical importance. Yet it is precisely to the years covered by his lifetime and to the cause represented in his person that we must look for the test of the English Revolution. In the course of those eighty years the principles of revolution triumphed once for all over the theory of divine right, which the Stuarts had appropriated to themselves with unfaltering persistency, and in defiance of the fact that their own claims to obedience were grounded upon the breach of this identical doctrine.¹ That democratic principles possess no intrinsic stability has been proved by the whole course of constitutional ebb and flow. It is but a superficial view of English history which gains currency in the complacent phrase about freedom broadening slowly down from precedent to precedent. What happened when Edward the First took up the reins of government from Henry the Third, who had been as clay in the hands of the constitutional

¹ The Stuarts traced their descent from Robert Bruce, elected by the Scottish nation in the place of John Baliol, who was descended from Margaret, eldest daughter of David, Earl of Huntingdon.

pottery? What happened when Edward the Third succeeded his impotent father? or when Richard the Second regained his authority in 1398? "The Parliament of Shrewsbury," writes Bishop Stubbs, "made Richard to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch."¹ Relapse, retrogression, recoil, claim a full share in the five centuries of conflict which preceded the Revolution. Similarly there can be little doubt of what would have happened if James Edward, like another Henry of Richmond, had obtained the crown. We should have seen a repetition, probably, of a Tudor despotism, when the period of its beneficence had long gone by. Servile parliaments would have sat in the seats of Cromwell and Pym, just as servile parliaments had followed Simon de Montfort, the Ordainers, and the Lords Appellant. In order to see how vividly these dangers were apprehended at the time, it is sufficient to glance at the pamphlets which appeared during the later years of Anne's reign, when a second Stuart restoration seemed only too feasible. "Farewell liberty, Europe will be French," is the text of Steele's *Crisis*, while Addison in *A Tory's Creed*² urges the danger of the Church of England in receiving a head bound to French interests and encouraged by his own religion to break his promises. Hoadley argues³ that a restoration will shew contempt of Parliament, and Defoe worries the same theme to death in a ponderous satire⁴ which affects to welcome the abolition of Parliament, dissolution of the Union, repudiation of the national debt and maintenance of a standing army.

¹ *Constitutional History of England*, ii. 521-2.

² *Freeholder*. No. 14.

³ *The Revolution and Anti-Revolution Principles stated and compared. An answer to a book called "Hereditary Right."*

⁴ *And what if the Pretender should come?*